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Abstract  
This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to 
define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has 
to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. 
Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside 
Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the 
fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new 
capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the 
multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which 
implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more 
realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems 
much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy 
substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually 
increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of 
cooperation with the rest of the world. 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, which is not over yet, has shown that finance matters a lot and 
exerts a powerful influence on the world economy. The increasing importance of finance, 
both private and public finance, is particularly true in Europe. Finance plays an essential role 
for the (mis)allocation of capital among sectors and countries. It is also a major factor of 
instability, both for the financial and the real sectors of the economy, at all levels: national, 
regional and international. 
A priori, it seems difficult to forecast what will be the evolution of financial markets in the 
coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable! Nevertheless, it is 
crucial to define what could be the future of finance due to its central importance for the 
world and European economies. 
Forecasting the evolution of finance is needed for regulation purposes: there is a need to adapt 
the rules to the transformation of financial markets in the future. This study is an attempt to 
analyze the wide array of possibilities in the future, as they range: (i) from a reform based on 
micro-prudential regulation to a strong state-controlled macro-prudential regulation; (ii) from 
regulation at a national level to regulation at a global level; and (iii) from strong capital 
controls between economic areas to strong financial integration. 
The methodology of this study will consist in building contrasted scenarios in order to allow 
for strategic thinking about the evolution of finance up to 2030. The scenarios will be built 
around the strategies of the major actors, public and private, of the world economy and 
financial markets, including the interrelated role of financial regulation and financial 
innovation. This study will also focus on the role of Europe as concerns financial markets and 
the impact of finance on Europe in 2030.  
The study is composed of three sections. The first section provides a description of the 
spontaneous trends of financial markets, with a focus on major players. Section 2 builds on 
the evolution of financial system depending on the different types of regulations implemented 
in the future decades. Finally, section 3 provides a panorama of five alternative scenarios 
based on different assumptions as to the strategies and the role of major players. These 
scenarios provide a framework for the analysis of the future of Europe in the world economy. 
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I-The spontaneous tendency of financial markets 
In this part, we define the spontaneous tendency of finance in order to pinpoint what could be 
the future strategies of operators, the future locations of financial centres, the most promising 
markets, and the new major players. 
Future strategies of financial operators 
The financial operators’ view is determinant in shaping future finance, since they will take 
strategic decisions inside banks and financial institutions. According to European bank 
managers and financial executives
3
, the main challenges are (i) the improvement of risk 
management, (ii) the adaptation to changing regulation, (iii) the intensification of price 
competition, (iv) the concentration of financial markets, and (v) the standardization of 
financial operations to facilitate automation, replacing workers with machines. Thus, financial 
institutions will try to increase their size and to reduce costs of financial transactions to deal 
with stronger competition in more globalised financial markets. Furthermore, while financial 
operators seem to have realized at least partially the shortcomings of their own risk 
management in the past, they worry now more about new regulatory constraints. To put it in a 
different way, they would prefer to deal with financial instability at the firm level rather than 
be closely controlled by state supervisors and regulatory authorities. 
Future locations of financial centres 
The future locations of financial centres will probably be rebalanced with the emergence of 
deeper markets in the emerging market economies. First, the development of Islamic finance 
could help centres to thrive in the Middle East and in Asia
4
. Secondly, if commodities became 
major safe havens for investors, some new centres in emerging countries – which produce 
them – could play a growing role5. Thirdly, the opening of financial markets in the emerging 
countries would undoubtedly change the situation greatly. For example, in 2010 China 
decided to make the Renminbi convertible for non-residents, paving the way for Honk Kong 
to become the most important financial centre in Asia. 
                                                 
3
 For more details, see Engstler and Welsch (2008), KPMG, (2008), and Ernst & Young, (2009). 
4
 According to International Financial Services London (2010), the countries which could benefit from the 
development of Islamic finance are: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain. 
5
 The BM&F Bovespa (Sao Paolo) or the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange (Mumbai), which 
grew rapidly in the last years, may have a stronger role in the future. We can also mention the brand new Dubai 
Multi Commodities Centre. 
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Promising markets 
It is rather difficult to identify promising markets for the next 20 years. There are some 
emerging new markets such as ethical and green finance which could be destined to play an 
important role in the future, but it is too early to assess their future importance. This depends 
crucially on future innovations, which are closely linked to regulation. According to both 
specialists and practitioners, the strategic markets should be derivatives. Otherwise, over-the-
counter markets could grow fast to avoid organized markets which could be much more 
regulated in the future. But this evolution may be stopped by new regulation, under study 
today, about the obligation of all actors on OTC to register with clearinghouses. 
Players 
The major players of financial markets will be both public and private entities. In the first 
place, the growth in the number of sovereign wealth funds
6
, which prefer riskier investments, 
could increase the exposure of government-controlled investments. Whereas central bank 
purchases of safe assets reduced the global interest rate in the 2000s, the growth of risky 
investments made by sovereign funds may lead to an increase in asset prices. On At the same 
time, private actors such as hedge funds and private equity are called upon to play an 
increasing role. It is difficult to define what would be their activities in the future, because 
those depend on the regulatory reforms that will be put in place. Nevertheless, speculative 
activities of hedge funds imply important systemic risks and may create contagion effects in 
the banking system. Public actors – regulators, states, central banks, and international 
organizations – are also bound to play an important role if the instability of financial markets 
is to be persistent. It may be that in some emerging countries – such as China – public 
authorities will play a dominant role, while the influence of private players is more important 
in countries where the market economy is more developed, as is the case in the US and in 
Europe. At the international level, civil society (meaning non-governmental organizations  
defending the general interest) is also bound to play an increasing role. International 
organizations, such as the IMF, may also have a growing influence, depending on the nature 
of the likely reforms of the international monetary system. 
 
                                                 
6
 Most of the sovereign wealth funds are in China, Russia and the OPEC countries which are major exporters of, 
respectively, manufactured goods and oil. 
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Financial innovation vs. regulation 
The development of financial innovation has been motivated for a long time by the desire to 
avoid taxes or government regulation. We can therefore expect that new regulatory constraints 
will be circumvented by financial innovations to come. We can distinguish two ways of 
avoiding regulatory constraints. On the one hand, financial operators can escape regulators by 
transferring their capital to offshore financial centres with a high degree of financial secrecy. 
On the other hand, institutions can create some new financial products and develop a “shadow 
banking system” or a “shadow financial market” in order to steer clear of regulation and 
supervision. 
II-Tools to regulate financial markets 
The two dimensions of financial regulation: micro- and macro-prudential regulations 
The role of prudential regulation is to prevent bank failures and financial crises. The reason 
for preventing financial crises is that the costs to society are more important than crises in 
other sectors and exceed the private cost to individual financial institutions. Prudential 
regulation aims at internalizing these externalities in the behaviour of such institutions. 
Prudential regulation has two dimensions: micro-prudential and macro-prudential. Micro-
prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of individual entities and the protection 
of clients of these institutions. Macro-prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of 
the financial system as a whole. Micro-prudential regulation consists of such measures as (i) 
the certification of those working in the financial sector; (ii) rules on what assets can be held 
by whom; (iii) how instruments are listed, traded, sold and reported; (iv) measures of the 
value and riskiness of assets. The Basel Committee on bank supervision has played a major 
role in defining the rules and instruments of micro-prudential regulation. One of the main 
tools put forward by the Basel Committee is that of capital adequacy requirements.   
Until recently, the Basel approach rested on the principle that the purpose of regulation is to 
ensure the soundness of individual institutions against the risk of loss on their assets. The 
Basel Committee doctrine was based on the false assumption that actions enhancing the 
soundness of a particular institution should also promote overall stability. However, ensuring 
the safety of each individual institution is not a sufficient condition for the soundness of the 
system as a whole. It is possible, indeed often likely, that attempts by individual institutions to 
remain solvent can push the system to collapse. The recent crisis was caused by banks 
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transferring risky toxic assets to other financial unregulated financial institutions such as 
hedge funds. One of the major causes of the crisis has been the deficit of macro-prudential 
regulation. 
Micro-prudential regulation examines the responses of an individual bank to exogenous risks. 
By definition, it does not incorporate endogenous risk. It also ignores the systemic importance 
of individual institutions as defined by their size, the degree of leverage they use, and their 
interconnectedness with the rest of the system. This is why we need to complement micro-
prudential regulation with macro-prudential regulation. The macro-prudential approach to 
regulation considers the systemic implications of the collective behaviour of banks.  
A critical feature of macro-prudence and systemic stability is the heterogeneity of the 
financial system. Homogeneity – everyone selling or buying at the same time – undermines 
the system. Invariably, market participants start off being heterogeneous but a number of 
factors – such as the use of similar techniques of risk measurement by banks – drive them to 
homogeneity. In this regard systemic risk is endogenous, and macro-prudential regulation is 
about identifying those endogenous processes that turn heterogeneity into homogeneity. 
There is a growing consensus that the most important manifestation of market failure in 
banking and financial markets is pro-cyclicality. According to this view, the purpose of 
macro-regulation is to act as countervailing force to the pro-cyclical behaviour of banks which 
is based on their underestimation of risks in a boom and their overestimation of risks in the 
subsequent collapse. This shift in risk perception from “too low” to “too high” is an essential 
problem. The purpose of macro-prudential regulation is to moderate financial cycles by 
narrowing this gap in forcing banks to improve their measurement of risks in boom and bust. 
A critical part of micro-prudential regulation in the last decade was the increasing use of 
market prices in valuation and risk assessment. This was done in the name of transparency, 
risk-sensitivity and prudence, but what it achieved was increasing homogeneity and 
cyclicality of market behaviour, hence also increased systemic fragility. Micro-prudential 
behaviour can thus endogenously create macro-prudential risks. 
Counter-cyclical bank regulation can be introduced through banks’ dynamic provisions 
systems, linking provisioning to the credit cycle.  This technique has already been used in 
Spain and Portugal. Such a system requires higher provisions when credit grows more than 
historical average and lower provisioning in slumps. An alternative approach for counter-
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cyclical bank regulation is via capital requirements. Basel III guidelines presented in 
September 2010 propose making bank capital charges counter-cyclical. 
Micro and macro-prudential regulation differ in their needed professionalism. Micro-
prudential regulation should be carried out by banking and financial market supervisors, 
whereas macro-prudential regulation should be put under the responsibility of central banks. 
Central banks should have to monitor credit expansion which is a major channel of bubbles 
and financial crises. Such instruments as loan-to-value ratios and progressive compulsory 
reserves on bank credit may be used by central banks to reduce credit cycles. 
Not all banks are alike. Regulation should acknowledge that some banks are systemically 
important. Tighter supervision of the latter banks needs to be implemented. By the same 
token, international cooperation is required for the regulation and supervision of banks which 
operate in several countries. 
In short, the subprime crisis has shown that the existing framework of banking regulation was 
insufficiently macro-prudential. A reform of financial and banking regulation is under way to 
introduce new instruments, and to achieve a new balance between micro- and macro-
prudential regulations. This is illustrated by the new Basel III guidelines presented in 
September 2010 or the reforms implemented in 2011 in the European Union along the lines 
proposed by the Larosière Report. 
Financial regulation at the international level 
At the international level, the regulator has three main objectives which are not necessarily 
compatible: (i) financial stability, (ii) independence of regulatory policy, (iii) financial 
integration. 
Financial stability seems to be the most obvious target. Since the last crisis a fairly clear 
consensus has emerged among the G20 central bankers (Banque de France, 2011). They agree 
on the need for enhanced supervision of the financial sector – especially for systemically 
important financial institution (SIFI) – and greater coordination of national policies in order to 
ensure financial stability internationally. One can note two interesting nuances among central 
bankers of emerging countries. They expect a change in the International Monetary System 
(IMS), which would imply more competition against the dollar, and better regulation of 
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speculative capital flows, by nature more volatile, since those have a particularly destabilizing 
effect on emerging markets. 
The independence of regulatory policy may appear desirable, because it allows each country 
to regulate its financial market according to national preferences. For example, following the 
example of Germany, other countries might wish to ban short sales or opt for more stringent 
prudential standards for systemically important actors (e.g. hedge funds). Indeed, preferences 
in the regulation of financial markets are quite heterogeneous in the world. On one side, 
Europeans seem willing to put in place a regulatory regime based on a strong coercive power 
of the authorities. On the other side, the United States appear more directed towards a system 
focused on market-based insurance mechanisms (Goodhart, 2010). 
For many years much of the economic literature has been arguing in favour of a greater 
degree of financial integration which is defined as better access to foreign capital markets for 
investors. Financial integration is supposed to have several advantages. Firstly, it enables a 
more efficient capital allocation, because savers benefit from a wider choice in their 
investment decisions and potentially have access to more lucrative investments. Secondly, the 
deregulation of national markets allows investors to diversify the risk of their portfolios more 
effectively by holding assets that are less correlated due to the fact that they are issued in 
countries with different economic characteristics. 
The second point, however, raises two questions. The first question concerns the impact of 
globalization on national circumstances. In recent decades traditional barriers to trade in 
goods and services and to capital flows have eroded and economies have become increasingly 
interdependent. When a shock occurs, it is felt throughout the system via fewer commercial 
opportunities, lower investment incomes, and devaluations of foreign assets. The second 
question is that of the consequences of greater financial integration on the resilience of 
financial markets. Indeed, there are good grounds for considering that breaking down barriers 
between national financial markets increases the global systemic risk. Thus, the reduction of 
portfolio risk expected from the international diversification is not so obvious, since financial 
integration would cause an increase in the risk to which all assets are exposed. Thus, the 
deepening of financial integration is beneficial only if systemic risk is reduced by an 
appropriate regulation at the global level. 
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To sum up, the efficiency of micro-prudential and macro-prudential measures depends on the 
capacity to control international financial markets. We can identify three main objectives of 
regulation at the international level. First, authorities try to reach a high degree of financial 
integration to allow a better allocation of capital and to permit a better diversification of risks. 
Second, governments want to improve financial stability, including the need to avoid 
international arbitrage between financial centres and their regulations (e.g. tax havens). Third, 
decision makers wish to maintain the independence of the national regulatory system in order 
to decide how financial activities should be regulated (e.g. limitations on short selling). These 
three objectives cannot be combined. 
Figure 1. The incompatibility triangle of financial objectives 
 
Note: in this figure, we indicated the scenarios described in the third part. 
The trilemma in financial regulation at the international level can be represented by a triangle 
with one of the objectives at each vertex. The regulator has to leave aside one of them. As 
financial stability is currently the first priority, authorities must either reduce financial 
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integration or accept to reinforce international governance
7
. Thus, it is necessary to adapt the 
scale of international regulation to the scale of risk caused by greater financial integration at 
the global level. 
In the context of open capital markets, it is impossible for a single nation-state to define an 
effective regulation of finance. Financial institutions will seek the least restrictive supervision 
system so as to avoid compliance with the standards set by the regulator
8
. Thus, even the most 
powerful prudential arsenal at the national level will be rendered inefficient by the opening-up 
of financial markets which permits investors to direct capital flows to the less regulated 
financial centres. G20 measures targeting tax havens seem inadequate. The list provided by 
the OECD is based primarily on criteria of transparency and exchange of information that are 
neither able to prevent offshore financial centres operating nor even neutralize the off-balance 
sheet investment vehicles
9
. 
III-Five scenarios 
After describing the spontaneous tendencies of finance and the tools available to regulate it, 
we will now discuss the effect of different regulatory policies on the natural evolution of 
markets. The issue is to describe the impact they could have on the world, according to the 
configuration chosen, and to determine what would be the best strategy for Europe. To do 
this, we define five scenarios
10
 that are distinguished by the leading actors who have the 
power to impose their strategies to the world. Alternatively, we define five groups 
distinguished by decision makers: Chimerica (United States and China), multinational 
corporations, nation-states, regional blocs, and supranational authorities. 
Chimerica: United States-China 
In this scenario, current trends continue, assuming that on the economic and financial levels 
the United States and China are in a position to impose their decisions, since none of the 
major players opposes them. On the one hand, the United States pursues a domestic demand-
led growth strategy. The Fed conducts an accommodative monetary policy, and fiscal policy 
                                                 
7
 See Aglietta (2011). 
8
 For further details about the inadequacy between international financial markets and institutions, and national 
supervision and crisis management, see (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010). 
9
 See on this point, the protest of Josef Pröll, the Austrian Minister of Finance (Vanessa Houlder, « Ports in a 
storm », Financial Times, November 17, 2009. 
10
 See Table 1 for details on scenarios.  
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is occasionally used to cover shortfalls in demand. On the other hand, China favours an 
export-led growth and continues to accumulate foreign exchange reserves – in dollars and, 
increasingly, in other currencies – to perform a slow and gradual revaluation of the Renminbi. 
In this way, the price competitiveness of China is maintained and the transition to domestic 
demand-led growth takes place smoothly. 
In this context, commodity export revenues will continue to grow. Sovereign wealth funds in 
commodity-exporting countries acquire an increasing amount of assets in developed 
countries, and very soon a steady income replaces commodity revenues. China and 
commodity-producing countries, which hold a large share of their assets in U.S. currency, 
maintain their peg to the US dollar which remains the international reference currency. 
Europe and the rest of the world are subjected to the growth strategies of other actors. The 
euro appreciates, because the U.S. and Chinese growth strategies cause a sharp increase in the 
supply of dollar assets relative to other currencies. European growth is slowed by the rise of 
prices expressed in euros. As debt sustainability depends on interest rates and on the growth 
rates of the GNP, GIIPS
11
 should find more and more difficult to meet interest payments. The 
euro area experiences increasingly strong tensions. Germany pursues its strategy of wage 
moderation, while the relative unit labour cost continues to grow in GIIPS (except in Spain 
and Ireland where it has been decreasing since 2008
12
). Since the Eurozone becomes weaker, 
the European influence on the global economy decreases rapidly. Moreover, as China and 
commodity-exporting countries diversify their exchange reserves in favour of Euros, Europe 
should pay increasingly high interests to these countries, which reduces GNP. 
Consolidation: multinational corporations (minimum state) 
We continue another important trend in recent decades: the declining power of states, 
matched at the same time by the growing influence of multinational corporations. We assume 
that large firms are becoming increasingly powerful. Thus, they can take advantage of 
competition between states that seek to become more attractive, particularly in terms of 
taxation, regulation, or confidentiality. Thus, multinationals have power to bypass regulation 
and supervision that governments try to establish. Investors will flock to financial markets 
                                                 
11
 Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
12
 See De Grauwe (2010), Figure 4. 
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with soft regulation at the expense of those trying to impose measures that reduce the 
competitiveness of firms, but are essential to the establishment of financial stability. 
Financial institutions are given free rein to develop their business globally. Financial industry 
becomes more concentrated, because players seek to reach the minimum size needed to be 
internationally competitive. Meanwhile, stock exchange markets continue to merge. After the 
creation of Euronext
13
 in 2000 and its merger with the New York Stock Exchange to create the 
NYSE Euronext group, a new merger could take place with Deutsche Börse. Thus, if the 
integration process taking place today in Europe and North America continues, it could well 
lead to the creation of a single global financial market that would improve liquidity. 
Governments tend to establish the least stringent regulatory standards possible – what is often 
termed the “race to the bottom” – and prefer self-regulation to attract large financial 
institutions that generate higher incomes. Within this oligopolistic global financial market, the 
trend towards automation of financial transactions continues without being too heavily 
constrained by regulators. The development of high-frequency trading generates an increase 
in gross trading volume, while net trading volume stagnates. We observe recurrent financial 
panics which can result from decisions of large operators and from the spread of automated 
trade execution
14
. Finally, the reinforcement of global financial integration increases systemic 
risk, but there is no supranational authority to regulate this supranational market. 
The few measures that have been taken to improve macro-prudential regulation are rapidly 
circumvented, because governments feel the need to woo financial institutions which make 
high profits. At the same time, the concentration of finance implies an increase in the number 
of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) and hence aggravates financial 
instability. In such a context, it is likely that financial crises and stock-market panics will 
become more frequent. This scenario could also lead to the fragmentation of the eurozone, 
which would result from a sudden stop in capital inflows to GIIPS. 
 
                                                 
13
 The group was founded in 2000 with originally Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Brussels Stock Exchange and 
Paris Bourse. Then, LIFFE joined them in 2001 and the Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto (BVLP) in 2002. 
14
 The stock market crash of 6 May 2010 provides an interesting example of such a financial panic. On this day, 
the main US financial indexes fell by 10% within 15 minutes, before returning to their previous level. For further 
information on the role played by automated trading strategies, see the report of the CFTC and SEC (2010) on 
that so-called “flash crash.” 
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Fragmentation: Nation-state (economic nationalism) 
The negative effects of globalization experienced by workers create a feeling of economic 
patriotism. Most economies in Europe and elsewhere prefer to adopt purely national economic 
governance and strictly control international capital flows. The globalized financial and 
economic space is divided to correspond to the social and political space. Fragmentation is a 
major concern of the private sector which fears a return to a strong state. Ernst & Young 
(2009) notes, moreover, a buzz on the word « protectionism » at the 2009 Davos Conference 
and that the fight against it is a priority for most decision makers.  
The financial markets are becoming more localized, and the regulation is country-specific. In 
some countries, the banking system may even be nationalized to closely regulate market 
activities. The retreat into protectionism also involves the establishment of exchange controls 
and the setting up of currency-undervaluation strategies which may further destabilize the 
foreign exchange market. In such a context, there exist major arbitrage opportunities for those 
with the ability to execute trades across borders. 
The euro-zone is fragmented, and each member-state returns to its previous national currency. 
This scenario is far from being impossible, if one looks at the nicknames used to refer to the 
indebted economies. The group of countries consisting of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain are often referred as PIIGS, GIPSI or “club med” by the economic press, in academia,  
and among bond analysts. These quite offensive nicknames stigmatize the lack of seriousness 
of indebted countries and reflect a deep resentment among North European countries against 
their Southern neighbors. 
The abandonment of the euro would have serious consequences on Europe. The intra-EU 
trade would be reduced because of the instability of prices in foreign European currencies and 
increase in transaction costs. European currencies become vulnerable again to speculative 
attacks and to currency crisis. The borrowing costs rise in South European countries, whereas 
German growth substantially slows down because of the appreciation of the Deutsche mark 
which becomes the main safe haven for investors. Finally, neither the North nor the South 
European countries seems to have an interest in returning to national monetary and exchange- 
rate policies. 
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Regionalisation: Regional integration 
In this case, the negative effects of financial globalization generate a different reaction of the 
national states: instead of reducing the economic space at the national level, they decide to 
create regional economic spaces. At the same time, political power is organized at the 
regional scale to meet the size of the economic space. Regional-states put in place a common 
financial regulation at the bloc level. We can also imagine the emergence of regional 
initiatives to counterbalance the power of governments and the influence of firms. Thus, a 
group of European elected officials launched a call
15
 to “organize the creation of a non-
governmental organization capable of developing a counter-expertise on activities carried out 
on financial markets by the major operators”. The goal of the “finance watch” project is to 
compete with the private lobbies which contributed to the engagement in riskier lending 
activities (Igan et al., 2009). 
In this scenario financial regulation is region-specific. The regional governments control 
capital flows to avoid regulatory arbitrage between regions. The blocs can be constituted on 
the basis of existing agreements. Beside the European Union, we could imagine that NAFTA, 
ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the CIS or the Arab League would move towards a stronger financial 
integration. The fragmentation of financial markets requires the financial institutions to adopt 
a different strategy in each bloc in order to adapt to region-specific characteristics. 
The eurozone enlarges to increase its weight in the world economy and the size of its 
domestic market. In fact, the wider the financial integration area and the more unified the 
regulation system are, the better the capital allocation and the diversification of portfolio risk 
will be. The full range of economic policy is put in place at the European level, beyond just 
monetary or fiscal policy. Europe benefits from advantages of financial integration at the 
continental level and can establish a financial regulation compatible with its systemic risk 
aversion, perhaps even creating a currency transaction tax. Afterwards, the “European 
government” might increase financial integration with the rest of the world in line with the 
degree of cooperation of regional blocs on prudential supervision and mutual surveillance of 
their banking systems. 
 
                                                 
15
 See the website of Finance Watch: http://www.callforfinancewatch.org/. 
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Multi-polar: global integration and supranational regulation 
The multi-polar scenario implies both a strong intervention capacity of governments and 
massive participation of civil society in the functioning of financial markets. First, 
governments of major world economies reach an agreement (e.g. at the level of G20, or an 
enlarged G20) on financial regulation and create the necessary institutions to enforce these 
common rules. Thus, political power is established at the scale of financial globalization with 
suitable supranational institutions capable of addressing the need for proactive global 
systemic risk management. Indeed, the cooperation of governments on a sufficiently binding 
regulation and the capability of supranational institutions to prevent the creation of offshore 
financial centres – as well as to limit other shadow transactions – are prerequisites for 
stabilizing financial markets. 
Second, this scenario necessitates the emergence of a counterbalancing force besides 
governments’ and multinational corporations’ powers. If there is already a world social forum 
for civil society – which is the answer to Davos’ World economic forum for corporations and 
to G20 summits for governments – this third force is not yet sufficiently organized to respond 
to the challenges of globalization, especially at the financial level. 
There are, however, some interesting citizens’ initiatives aimed at rebalancing globalization. 
On the one hand, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) claim that “the interaction among the Fed’s 
monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation 
created the toxic mix of conditions making the U.S. the epicentre of the global financial 
crisis.” Thus, it seems more than necessary to create a civil society organization – i.e. the 
equivalent of the European “Finance Watch” at the global scale – that would keep an eye on 
financial authorities and institutions in order to avoid the repetition of such a disaster. 
On the other hand, civil society could also put in place payment systems in addition to 
traditional banking. Lietaer (2008) argues that the development of local monies would deal 
with the problem of crises in increasing the resilience of the economic system, even if it 
would reduce the efficiency of the monetary system. Therefore, the question of monetary 
creation is sensitive, since the excess of liquidity – which means a creation of liquidity 
beyond the credit absorption capacity of the US economy – contributed to the subprime crisis. 
Ethical finance is an interesting alternative for investors wishing to devote their savings to 
progressively managed firms which respect the environment, comply with the international 
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labour code, and  refrain from speculative activities. The development of such finance could 
have stabilizing effects on markets.  
To summarize, in this scenario we assume a combined success of governments and civil 
society to rebalance the financial globalization process. On the government side, success 
implies renouncing national preferences. Nation-states must adopt a similar regime of 
financial regulation with common rules in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage. This means the 
end of tax havens that would render ineffective the attempts to regulate at the global level. On 
the civil-society side, counterbalancing powers must be created to oppose the lobbies of 
financial institutions and to watch the developments of financial markets. Under these 
conditions Europe and the rest of the world could fully enjoy the benefits of financial 
globalization, yielding a more efficient allocation of capital and better distribution of risk. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this article was to provide insight into the future of financial markets and 
regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. The main objectives 
of financial regulators should be stability and market efficiency. However, favourite methods 
to achieve stability can be rather different from country to country and may depend on 
national preferences or institutional tradition. 
We have shown that it was difficult to combine financial stability with both financial 
integration and sovereign financial regulation. This implies that Europe has to choose between 
financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. The options are 
summed up in Table 2. Three of the five scenarios achieve financial stability both inside and 
outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the 
fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new 
capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the 
multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which 
implies moving further away from respective national preferences. 
Finally, even if the multi-polar scenario is the first best solution, the more realistic option 
seems to be the regionalisation scenario. On the one hand, the regional level of coordination 
seems much more realistic than the global one, since the preferences are much more similar 
on that scale. On the other hand, it should be of sufficient size in order to enjoy substantial 
benefits of integration. However, it may be appropriate for the “European government” to 
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gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of 
cooperation with the rest of the world. 
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Table 1. Presentation of the five scenarios 
   Bipolar Consolidation Fragmentation Regionalisation Multipolar 
Decision 
makers 
USA-China                 
(Europe?) 
Big companies               
(minimum state) 
Nation-state                   
(Economic nationalism) 
Regional integration Supranational 
L
ev
el
 o
f 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
 
M
ic
ro
p
ru
- 
d
en
ti
al
 
Basel III 
Emphasis on microprudential 
regulation (Autoregulation) 
Country-specific Region-specific Basel III modified 
M
ac
ro
p
ru
d
en
ti
al
 
Some macroprudential 
regulation and supervision. 
Credit rating agencies are 
more supervised but they are 
still paid by the issuers 
(conflict of interest). 
Macroprudential regulation is 
circumvented by financial 
innovations 
Country-specific Region-specific 
Supranational institution in 
charge of macroprudential 
regulation. Credit rating 
agencies are closely 
supervised and they are paid 
by investors that they protect. 
S
u
p
ra
n
at
io
n
al
 
Minimum reform to improve 
the transparency of tax havens 
The transparency is 
insufficient and international 
regulatory arbitrage continues 
No coordination of regulation 
systems. Strong heterogeneity 
of national preferences in 
terms of financial regulation 
(e.g. tax on financial 
transactions, limitations on 
short sellings) 
Coordination inside regional 
unions, but low coordination 
between blocs 
Coordination at the global 
level 
IM
S
  
 
IMS mostly based on dollar 
with a more and more 
important role for Yuan. Euro 
remains a second class 
currency. 
Domination of big banks and 
accommodation by central 
banks 
Three international moneys: 
dollar, euro and yuan. 
A world money for 
international transactions and 
reserves (SDR or Bancor) 
Regional monetary zone 
(Mercosur, euro area, 
ASEAN, CIS, Arab league…) 
Im
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
fo
r 
  
  
  
 
E
u
ro
p
e 
a
n
d
 f
o
r 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
th
e 
re
st
 o
f 
th
e 
w
o
rl
d
 
Strong euro which adjust 
global imbalances. Growing 
tensions inside the euro area. 
Emergence of a world 
financial markets open 7/7 & 
24/24. Volatility of prices. 
Persistent financial instability, 
debt crisis and implosion of 
the eurozone. 
Important arbitrage 
opportunities between 
countries. Implosion of the 
euro area.Strong speculation 
on North European countries 
(Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands…) and higher 
cost of debt for GIIPS. 
Reduction of trade intra 
Europe. 
Development of a multipolar 
network of financial centers 
with some degree of 
specialization Enlargment of 
European Union to increase 
the size of the domestic 
economy. Strenthening of 
political Europe. Stronger 
economic and financial 
integration in Europe. 
Regional financial integration 
with differentiation of 
financial systems, Growing 
integration of European Union 
with the world economy. 
Reinforcement of the power 
of global institutions (G20, 
UN, IMF, WB, WTO…) 
instead of European 
institutions. 
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Table 2. Regulation policy at the international level 
 
Decision makers 
Financial 
stability 
Financial 
integration 
Heterogeneity of 
national 
regulations 
 
Inside the 
euro area 
Outside the 
euro area 
Inside the 
euro area 
Outside the 
euro area 
Inside the 
euro area 
Outside the 
euro area 
Bipolar 
USA-China 
(Europe?)   + −  + + −  + 
Consolidation 
Big companies 
(minimum state)  −  −  + + + + 
Fragmentation 
Nation-states 
(Economic 
nationalism) 
+ + −  −  + + 
Regionalisation Regional unions + + + −  −  + 
Multipolar 
Supranational 
institutions + + + + −  −  
 
